POLY-AMERICA, L.P. v. API INDUSTRIES, INC. (Fed. Cir. 2016) (P) – Disparaging a particular feature in the prior art generally constitutes a disclaimer of that feature

Disparaging a particular feature in the prior art generally constitutes a disclaimer of that feature in the claimed invention. Here, for example, a trash bag with so-called “short seals” in its upper corners was found to be limited to a design in which the short seals...

GPNE CORP. v. APPLE INC. (Fed. Cir. 2016) (P) – Both repeated and summation characterizations of the invention serve to limit the invention as a whole

Both repeated and summation characterizations of the invention serve to limit the invention as a whole. Here, for example, the generic term “node” was found to be limited to a “pager … that operates independently from a telephone network” because the specification...

UNWIRED PLANET, LLC v. APPLE INC. (Fed. Cir. 2016) (P) – Descriptions only tangentially related to characterizing “the present invention” are not limiting per se

Descriptions that are only tangentially related to characterizations of “the present invention” should not be read as constituting a mandatory claim limitation to be read into the claims. Here, for example, a statement about the “present invention” in the first...

RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS (Fed. Cir. 2016) (P) – Broadening statements in the specification may act as a ceiling for claim breadth

Broadening statements in the specification may act as a ceiling for claim breadth. Here, for example, the claimed “communications path” was found to be limited to wired communication at the exclusion of wireless communication because the specification, in asserting...

CSP TECHNOLOGIES, INC. v. SUD-CHEMIE AG (Fed. Cir. 2016) (NP) – The disclosure-dedication rule does not require an explicit labeling of “alternative” embodiments

The disclosure-dedication rule does not require that the specification explicitly label which embodiments are “alternatives” to bar otherwise apparent alternatives from infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Here, for example, even though the specification...

BAMBERG v. DALVEY (Fed. Cir. 2016) (P) – Distinguishing prior art as “undesired” may limit the scope of the claims

Distinguishing the prior art as “undesired” is equivalent to distinguishing it as “inferior” and may therefore limit the scope of the claims as necessarily excluding the undesired features. Here, for example, a broad claim added during an interference to cover a...